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Abstract 
Extant research has shown that neutralization processes can enable potential IS security policy violators 
to justify their behavior and overcome the deterrence effect of sanctions in order to engage in unethical 
behaviors. However, such sanctions are typically moderate and not career ending. We test the boundary 
conditions of this theory by evaluating whether neutralization plays a role in overcoming the impact of 
extreme levels of deterrence. We extend the Siponen and Vance (2010) framework within a 
professional context that assigns extreme sanctions to violators. Using the scenario-based factorial 
survey method common in IS security research, we collected data from future auditors who understand 
these extreme sanctions. We test the reasons that auditors may use to form intentions to falsify 
information concerning an information security issue with a company’s accounting information system, 
thereby jeopardizing data integrity and security by modifying working papers to hide irregularities and, 
by doing so, violating their professional standards, which could result in career-ending sanctions. We 
empirically validated and tested the theoretical model. Our results show that sanctions play an important 
role in reducing employees’ intentions to violate policy but that, even under extreme boundary 
conditions, employees might seek to rationalize their unethical behavior by denying responsibility for 
their actions through, for example, arguing that their supervisors pressured them into performing the 
violations. We also establish that messages heightening the awareness and perceptions of the certainty 
and severity of organizational punishment are likely to attenuate such deviant behaviors. We discuss 
the implications of these findings and suggest future avenues for research.  
Keywords: Deterrence Theory, Security, Neutralization, Compliance, Ethics, Theory Contextualization, 
Boundary Conditions 
Fred Niederman was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on June 30, 2017 and underwent 
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1 Introduction 
The literature on violations of organizational 
information security policy has evaluated violations 
that may invoke a managerial sanction (punishment), 
which is presented as having a deterrent effect. 
However, this rich body of literature has evaluated 
situations in which the punishment was measured and 
not extreme. We seek to extend and amplify the 
findings of Siponen and Vance (2010) by testing the 
application of their theory regarding the impacts of 
neutralization and deterrence on employee intentions 
to violate policies under broader boundary conditions. 
In accordance with Whetten’s (1989) suggestion that 
theory is strengthened when conditions that may 
restrict the breadth of current theoretical understanding 
are better understood, we use the context of violations 
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of auditor rules to explore whether the findings 
regarding the deterrent effect of sanctions also apply 
when the sanction threat is an extreme, potentially 
career-ending punishment.  
The former Wall Street darling Enron Corporation 
offers a prime example of auditor rule violations; in 
this case, the audit firm and the client organization 
colluded to commit financial fraud. Established in 
1985, Enron was once a corporate giant in the energy 
and gas industry and one of the largest companies in 
the United States. With its demise in December 2001, 
Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen & Company, was 
subjected to considerable scrutiny for validating 
Enron’s fraudulent books (Abelson & Glater, 2002). 
As a result, considerable debate regarding auditor 
independence has emerged in the accounting and 
auditing literature (Bazerman et al., 2002).  
Prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 
Act of 2002, auditors relied far more on consulting 
revenue generated from clients than revenue generated 
from audits themselves. In the case of Arthur 
Andersen, more than half of the $52 million in fees 
received from Enron was attributable to consulting 
services rather than regular audit fees (Abelson & 
Glater 2002), suggesting that an auditor might be 
tempted to simply ignore fraudulent bookkeeping 
found with a major client. Indeed, as Abelson and 
Glater (2002, p. 1) point out: “There’s no way that you 
could have a client which is that huge and important to 
you and not be tempted to turn your head away from 
problems.”  
While the current post-SOX regulations prohibit 
auditors from providing consulting services to their 
clients, auditors remain motivated to maintain the good 
graces of their clients because their clients have the 
power to fire them at any time during an audit. 
Although ignoring a client’s fraudulent bookkeeping 
activities and returning favorable results can subject an 
auditor to severe penalties, auditors might be 
conflicted as to whether they should offer clients 
favorable results in order to retain the clients. Thus, 
even under the threat of severe sanctions, auditors 
might seek to rationalize the practice of overlooking 
certain irregularities or financial misstatements 
discovered during an audit. 
In the present study, we extend and amplify the 
findings of Siponen and Vance (2010) by testing the 
application of their theory elucidating the impacts of 
neutralization and deterrence on employee intentions 
to violate policies under broader boundary conditions. 
Siponen and Vance offer an explanation for how 
employees rationalize their failure to comply with 
information systems security policies, a major concern 
for information technology security managers. They 
propose a theoretical model, based on criminology’s 
deterrence theory, that highlights the role of 
“techniques of neutralization” used by potential 
violators to overcome the impact of organizational 
sanctions. Such techniques “provide a temporary 
release from their conventional restraints, including 
formal and informal sanctions” (Akers & Sellers 2004, 
p. 488), thereby neutralizing feelings of guilt or shame 
by enabling potential offenders to justify or rationalize 
their actions. Matza (1964) calls this temporary release 
“drift”—“an episodic relief from moral restraint” 
(Maruna & Copes 2005, p. 231). Siponen and Vance’s 
empirical findings show that various techniques of 
neutralization are directly associated with employee 
intentions to violate IS security policy; they work in 
tandem with the direct impacts of both formal and 
informal sanctions identified in other research. 
Subsequently, D’Arcy and Herath (2011) have called 
for more work on deterrence and suggest taking a cue 
from criminologists and refining deterrence theory by 
testing “the conditions under which the threat of 
sanctions is likely to influence behavior” (p. 655) using 
various situational variables. Willison and Warkentin 
(2013) also call for more research to understand the 
roles of neutralization and deterrence in the 
information security context. They suggest that 
researchers should study neutralization in relation to 
specific forms of computer abuse and their influence 
on the effectiveness of deterrence, especially at the 
margins of our current understanding of this 
phenomenon. Barlow et al. (2013) call for more 
research into the role of neutralization by “extreme 
policy breakers” whose decision factors may fall 
outside the “normal” range. Accordingly, we ask: Do 
employees who face extreme sanctions yet still violate 
security policies also use techniques of neutralization 
to justify their decisions? 
Johns (2006) and other scholars have recently called 
for greater scrutiny of theorization and theory 
contextualization in an effort to improve the 
sophistication, value, and applicability of our 
theoretical lenses. Salovaara and Merikivi (2015) 
suggest that reexamining published studies to verify or 
extend their findings offers the opportunity to increase 
the knowledge of the boundary conditions of existing 
theories and strengthen the research community by 
accelerating the exchange of interaction between 
researchers. Whetten (1989) describes boundary 
conditions as functions that “place limitations on the 
propositions generated from a theoretical model. These 
temporal and contextual factors set the boundaries of 
generalizability, and as such constitute the range of the 
theory” (p. 492). Boundary conditions should be tested 
to ensure that theories apply to broader contexts. In 
several key articles in the Journal of the Association 
for Information Systems, leading IS scholars have 
urged us to pursue this process: Weber (2012) states 
that theories must circumscribe the boundary or 
domain of a theory, i.e, “the phenomena it is intended 
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to cover.” (p. 6). Citing Gray and Cooper (2010, p. 
627), Weber adds that “some scholars argue that a 
field’s understanding of the boundary conditions 
associated with its theories is a good proxy for the 
quality of its theories and the state of the field more 
generally (Weber, 2012, p. 6). Indeed, Kohli and 
Grover (2008, p. 1) maintain that “it is important to set 
the boundary conditions” for IS research domains. 
Furthermore, Grover (2012) reports that IS research 
must “develop clear boundary conditions” (p. 262) and 
suggests that researchers should “enforce definitional 
boundary conditions” in their work (p. 266). Seddon 
and Scheepers (2012, 2015) reiterate these research 
guidelines and argue that extant works should be tested 
for the refinement of boundary conditions. Whetten et 
al. (2009) explicate how theory contextualization, or 
the extent to which a theory explicitly accounts for 
relevant contextual conditions, enables scholars to 
provide a theoretical contribution. We test the 
boundary conditions for the theoretical lenses of 
neutralization theory and deterrence theory in the 
context of auditor rule violations in which potential 
violators clearly understand the extreme magnitude of 
the sanction associated with the ethical violation: 
suspension or loss of their license to practice.  
Although previous InfoSec studies focusing on 
information security policy violations have not directly 
discussed whether policy violations are ethical or not, 
they imply that policy violations are unethical through 
the use of scenario-based methods. Siponen and Vance 
(2010) justify the use of scenario-based methodology 
because it “offer[s] an indirect way of measuring 
intention to commit unethical behavior,” and it “can 
incorporate situational details thought to be important 
in decisions to behave unethically” (pg. 492). Siponen 
and Vance also identify issues related to policy 
violations, such as software piracy and computer 
abuse, as unethical. D’Arcy et al. (2009) do not discuss 
ethics specifically but identify security policy violation 
behaviors such as personal use of company email as 
“unethical and/or inappropriate” (p. 82). 
Most of the recent InfoSec studies that have tested 
deterrence (D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Herath & Rao, 
2009; Higgins et al., 2005; Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Li 
et al., 2010; Pahnila et al., 2007; Siponen et al., 2007; 
Zhang et al., 2009) focus on policy violations rather 
than on the ethics of acts of security policy 
noncompliance. D’Arcy and Herath (2011) discuss 
“moral beliefs,” which refer to the “extent to which one 
perceives an illicit act to be morally offensive” (p. 
646), instead of a complete ethical system. This seems 
appropriate, given that determining what is ethical or 
not can be based on a subjective individual judgment. 
Relevant to this paper, auditors hold special 
responsibility, and they are bound by a code of 
professional conduct that is enforced by the AICPA’s 
Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC). 
Furthermore, Siponen and Vance (2010) tested a 
binary (comply or not comply) decision at relatively 
low levels of perceived cost and benefit to the potential 
policy violator. The rationalization allowed regular 
workers to engage in minor violations when the payoff 
was not particularly great.  
For “run-of-the-mill” common behaviors, the extant 
literature has done a tremendous job of researching 
deterrence related to IS behaviors in terms of policy 
violations. Certainly, the threat of prison sentences 
may also be a potent deterrent of violation intentions. 
However, in the context of auditors conducting an IS 
audit, committing fraudulent acts that may result in 
losing their CPA license and subsequently their ability 
to practice their chosen profession is not a run-of-the-
mill behavior with a run-of-the-mill punishment. Thus, 
the experimentally manipulated scenario presented in 
our research design places the participants in a 
situation that enables testing of the boundary 
conditions of the relevant theories and thereby 
contributes to the extant literature. We test boundary 
conditions by testing the efficacy of the extant theory 
under extreme levels of perceived formal 
organizational sanctions. Therefore, we selected a 
sample comprised of individuals who understand that, 
if they are caught, the sanction for engaging in the 
violation of professional certification standards 
described would likely result in the termination of their 
careers. 
We seek to extend and strengthen the applicability of 
the Siponen and Vance (2010) framework, as it applies 
to policy violation behaviors and test the boundary 
conditions of extant applications of this theory. 
Specifically, we seek to contribute to the debate on the 
role of neutralization as an influence on the security 
decisions of employees by testing why auditors form 
the intention to (1) violate their professional standards 
(which could result in career-ending sanctions), (2) 
violate policy by altering strategic data by modifying 
working papers to hide irregularities and (3) thereby 
jeopardize the integrity and security of strategic 
corporate information.  
1.1 Internal Data Integrity Threats 
Firms must maintain the security of their systems by 
protecting data against external and internal threats to 
data integrity, but internal threats to data integrity 
represent the greatest challenge. Unethical auditing 
behavior represents a significant and pernicious internal 
attack on data integrity. Auditors are stewards and 
curators of strategic information and hold a special 
responsibility in this context. The goal of managing 
information security is to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability—traditionally called the CIA 
triad—of valuable information assets that may be 
strategic, protected, sensitive, or proprietary (Anderson, 
2003; Parker, 1998). Corporate fraud, including 
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unethical auditing behavior, creates significant costs for 
businesses, and incidents have been increasing. (For a 
thorough explanation of the corporate fraud violation 
environment, please see Appendix A.) 
We draw on neutralization theory and deterrence theory, 
which are prominent in the criminology literature, to 
focus on identifying the antecedents of auditors’ 
behavioral intentions to violate policy by altering 
evidence regarding an information security issue 
involving the accounting information system. 
Specifically, we contextualize the contributions of 
Siponen and Vance (2010) in our research and test the 
boundary conditions of their theory. The remainder of 
this paper is structured as follows. First, we summarize 
the extant literature on internal control deficiencies, 
fraud, and auditor standards. Next, we identify relevant 
gaps in the literature and develop a theoretical model 
based on well-established prominent theories in 
criminology regarding deviant behavior. We then 
discuss the research method and results of the 
hypothesis testing. Finally, we conclude the paper by 
discussing our findings, their implications on theory and 
practice, and future research directions.  
2 Research Motivation and 
Theoretical Background 
Insider information is a strategic resource that must be 
protected (Renaud et al., 2019). Extensive evidence 
indicates that insider threats, including information 
alteration and theft, represent a significant 
organizational problem that is difficult to address 
(Barlow et al., 2018; Ho & Warkentin, 2017; 
Kaspersky, 2015; Kim et al., 2019; Ormond et al., 
2019; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2014; Willison et al., 
2018). Though any insider is capable of nonmalicious 
deviant behavior (Guo et al., 2011), the greatest 
damage generally results when a critical member of an 
organization behaves against the interests of that 
organization in an illegal and/or unethical manner 
(Warkentin & Willison 2009). The term “insider” 
refers to employees, contractors, or other stakeholders 
who have (1) legitimate access to the facilities and 
information systems of the organization, and (2) 
intimate knowledge of internal organizational 
processes that may allow them to exploit weaknesses 
(Willison & Warkentin 2013). Additionally, certain 
privileged insiders have greater access to strategic 
information and greater knowledge of key business 
processes (Sharma & Warkentin, 2019), which may 
exhibit flaws in the organizational process control for 
protecting information assets (Butler, 2012). Because 
trusted insiders can potentially expose the 
organization to a great deal of potential harm, they 
pose a significant threat. 
Management is responsible for designing and 
implementing internal controls capable of reducing or 
eliminating the threats posed by insiders. Internal 
controls are defined as “a process—effected by those 
charged with governance, management, and other 
personnel—designed to provide reasonable assurance 
about the achievement of the entity’s objectives with 
regard to the reliability of financial reporting, 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations” 
(AICPA 2009, p. 1843). According to the AICPA SAS 
No. 115, a deficiency exists when the design or 
operation of a control does not allow management or 
employees to prevent, or detect and correct 
misstatements or fraud on a timely basis while 
performing their assigned functions. Deficiencies can 
be deemed material weaknesses or significant 
deficiencies and auditors should evaluate the severity 
of each deficiency identified during an audit.  
Audit firms are engaged to perform information 
systems audits, which are intended “to review and 
evaluate internal controls that protect the system.” 
(Romney & Steinbart 2015, p. 315) If any significant 
deficiencies or material weaknesses related to internal 
controls in the information system are identified, the 
auditor is required to communicate that in writing to 
management and to those charged with governance as 
part of the audit. If the deficiencies are not significant 
deficiencies or material weaknesses and the auditor 
decides to properly communicate this information to 
management, this communication must be documented 
(AICPA 2009). Intentionally failing to report 
significant deficiencies or material weakness in the 
internal controls of the information system by 
modifying audit working papers and thus producing an 
inaccurate audit report is fraud and can make the 
organization vulnerable to the threats to the 
information system that remain uncontrolled. The 
Office of the Inspector General of Idaho has shown that 
the following weaknesses are considered high impact 
and may lead to increased vulnerabilities in 
organizational information systems: inadequacies in 
the logical access security controls, physical access 
controls, network security, and security control 
policies and procedures (Salmon, 2014). 
Employees who violate policies by failing to comply 
with established information reporting standards may 
be motivated by various root causes. Greed, revenge, 
or managerial pressures may motivate noncompliance. 
Employees may engage in noncompliant policy 
workarounds motivated by positive goals or may lack 
a clear understanding of policies and standards. 
Auditing standards represent an exception to 
“understandable” violations that may sometimes be 
excused because the violation of the auditing standards 
described here is always an ethical breach that can 
result in career-ending (maximum) sanctions. (For an 
in-depth assessment of the motivation and 
consequences of security policy violation behavior, see 
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Willison and Warkentin, 2013.) The extended security 
action cycle (Willison & Warkentin, 2013) suggests 
that employees may progress from the motivation 
stage to the formation of behavioral intentions to 
commit computer abuse (deviance behavior and 
unethical act) in a cognitive process explained by 
various theories—in our case, deterrence theory and 
neutralization theory. 
Neutralization theory and deterrence theory form the 
foundation of this investigation and inform our 
theoretical model, which is shown in Figure 1. The 
model shows how auditor behavioral intentions to 
violate policy by altering evidence concerning an 
information security issue with the accounting 
information system are directly influenced by 
neutralization, perceived sanctions, and the degree of 
violation. Neutralization theory suggests that 
individuals apply techniques of neutralization to justify 
unethical behavior. Deterrence theory suggests that, in 
the presence of negative sanctions or punishments, 
individuals are less likely to commit deviant behavior 
or violate policy. We argue that the degree of violation, 
i.e., whether the individual removes or modifies the 
deficiencies in working papers, influences behavioral 
intentions to violate policy. 
2.1 Theory of Neutralization 
Sykes and Matza (1957) originally proposed that 
criminal offenders often use justifications in 
rationalizing their deviant behavior, thereby enabling 
them to violate social norms without being deterred by 
feelings of guilt or shame. This process is basically a 
mechanism whereby the potential offender neutralizes 
behavioral norms, making them inoperative, and frees 
him- or herself to engage in deviant behavior without 
feeling that it is actually wrong (Rogers & Buffalo, 
1974). Sykes and Matza (1957) proposed five 
techniques of neutralization that enable offenders to 
engage in deviant acts or behaviors that violate social 
norms: (1) denial of the victim, (2) condemnation of 
the condemners, (3) appeal to higher loyalties, (4) 
denial of responsibility, and (5) denial of injury. 
Additional techniques of neutralization were later 
presented by other scholars, such as the metaphor of 
the ledger (Klockars, 1976), defense of necessity 
(Minor, 1981), and denial of the necessity of the law 
(Coleman, 1985). For a thorough discussion of 
neutralization theory in the context of information 
systems security, see Willison and Warkentin (2013). 
Social norms are presumed to be the grammar of social 
interactions, which acts as a set of rules and guidelines 
to determine what is acceptable and what is not in a 
society (Bicchieri, 2005). When an individual disrupts 
these social norms by engaging in deviant behavior, 
neutralization techniques will provide the individual 
with the freedom to momentarily suspend the 
obligation to uphold social norms. However, this 
rationalization does not necessarily entail a rejection of 
the commonly accepted social norms but rather an 
acceptance of the norms and a subsequent justification 
of them in order to engage in the deviant behavior 
(Eliason & Dodder 1999). In the current study, the 
social norms of ethical behavior in the auditing 
profession (e.g., exercising due care, following 
company policies, adhering to applicable rules and 
regulations, etc.) are set forth in codes of conduct in 
accounting firms, state accounting boards, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
and other governing bodies of the accounting 
profession.  
Techniques of neutralization have proven to be a 
powerful lens for understanding individual intentions 
to violate societal norms or organizationally 
sanctioned actions in many contexts. Eliason and 
Dodder (1999) investigated the techniques of 
neutralization used by deer poachers to justify their 
hunting activities. Although neutralization techniques, 
in general, were found to have a significant impact on 
the justification of these activities, denial of 
responsibility, the metaphor of the ledger, the defense 
of necessity, and the condemnation of the condemners 
were found to be the most common justifications used 
by the deer poachers. Additionally, Brennan (1974) 
studied the techniques of neutralization used by 
individuals who receive abortions, and Priest and 
McGrath (1970) investigated how the techniques of 
neutralization are used by young adult marijuana 
smokers. Brennan (1974) found that individuals use 
some techniques of neutralization, such as denial of 
responsibility, condemnation of the condemners, and 
appeals to higher loyalties to rationalize getting an 
abortion and to prevent associated guilt, anxiety, or 
depression. Alvarez (1997) also applied techniques of 
neutralization to explain why individuals cooperated 
with group acts of genocide.  
Dunford and Kunz (1973) used some of the techniques 
of neutralization as a lens to explain the reduction of 
dissonance within a religious community. Empirical 
tests of neutralization theory as an antecedent of actual 
criminal behavior have yielded mixed results because 
the theory is often understood as a means to determine 
the etiology of the mental state of criminal defendants 
(Maruna & Copes 2005), which presumably led them 
to commit crimes. According to Maruna and Copes, 
(2005), neutralization theory and the rationalization 
techniques used by offenders should be viewed as 
contributing to the persistence or cessation of a crime 
rather than as a theory of criminal etiology because 
offenders cannot neutralize their actions prior to 
committing crimes. As stated by Sykes and Matza 
(1957), “it is by learning these techniques that the 
juvenile becomes delinquent” (p. 667).  




Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
 
But in a recent review of the theory, Copes and Deitzer 
(2015) conclude that, when applied to various specific 
acts of deviance, the theory is widely accepted as a 
result of empirical validation as either a direct 
antecedent of social deviance (norm violation) or as a 
positive moderator of other impacts on deviance 
(Hinduja, 2007; Smallridge & Roberts, 2013). Recent 
advancements have demonstrated the efficacy of this 
theory in understanding how neutralization use by 
offenders is differentiated by situational factors (Copes 
& Deitzer, 2015), which is our goal. The breadth of 
empirical support for the role of these methods of 
justifying rule-breaking behaviors establishes this as a 
solid foundation for the context of our focal 
phenomenon. Accordingly, Willison and Warkentin 
(2013) call for further applications of this theoretical 
tool as a means of investigating organizational security 
policy violation intentions.  
Siponen and Vance (2010) empirically evaluated how 
employees justify their computer security policy 
violation behavior by utilizing six neutralization 
techniques: defense of necessity, appeal to higher 
loyalties, condemn the condemners, metaphor of the 
ledger, denial of injury, and denial of responsibility, 
along with the formal and informal sanctions. Their 
results reveal that techniques of neutralization exert a 
significant impact on an employee’s intention to 
violate organizational security policies. Barlow et al. 
(2013) also show that employees suppress their ethical 
instincts to comply with information security policies 
by cognitively applying these techniques of 
neutralization. (Willison & Warkentin, 2013) also 
found that neutralization plays a role in overcoming 
guilt and shame, thus enabling individuals to form 
intentions to violate information system security 
policy, a type of workplace deviance. Barlow et al. 
(2018) investigated whether various types of 
organizational communication could dissuade 
employees from using neutralization techniques to 
justify their deviant policy violations. Their results 
indicate that security communications and training 
centered on neutralization techniques are effective 
methods that organizations can use to minimize 
employee policy violations. Finally, Willison et al. 
(2018) tested both deterrence and neutralization as 
modifiers of the relationship between perceptions of 
organizational injustice and the intention to commit 
computer abuse. The study results indicate that 
neutralization through the denial of the victim and the 
metaphor of the ledger positively moderate the 
relationship between perceptions of procedural, 
organizational injustice and the intention to commit 
computer abuse. 
Because each neutralization technique is unique, 
previous research projects have carefully and logically 
assessed each technique within the context of the focal 
phenomenon of violation and violators. This is 
typically accomplished by empirically testing the 
relevant techniques to determine whether each 
technique may individually prove to be a source of 
variance in the intention to commit deviant behavior. 
Because our focal phenomenon was the working 
professional who contemplates committing an 
egregious career-ending violation, we selected a 
specific situation in which employees are faced with 
extreme sanctions for violations. Subsequently, we 
carefully read the literature on audit fraud and 
consulted with both auditors and educators to assess 
the possible role of each neutralization technique 
within the auditor fraud context to select the most 
likely ones for further investigation. Collectively, the 
sources indicated that the following five neutralization 
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techniques fit the context of our study: denial of 
responsibility, denial of injury, appeal to higher 
loyalties (Sykes & Matza 1957), defense of necessity 
(Minor 1981), and metaphor of the ledger (Klockars 
1976). Potential uses of each neutralization technique 
proposed by the auditors and/or educators are included 
in the development of the first five hypotheses. The 
following section introduces these neutralization 
techniques as theoretical foundations of our research 
hypotheses.  
2.1.1 Denial of Responsibility 
When using denial of responsibility, individuals justify 
their actions by stating that they were a victim of the 
occurrence and therefore lack responsibility for their 
actions. Moreover, individuals justify their actions by 
simply stating that it was not their fault and they were 
forced into the situation (Sykes & Matza, 1957). An 
auditor, for example, may reason that since a 
supervisor told him or her to perform a particular 
action (e.g., reporting a number of billable hours that 
differ from those hours actually worked on a particular 
job), the supervisor is responsible for the action, thus 
absolving the auditor of the responsibility. In the 
context of IS security, Siponen and Vance (2010) 
found that denial of responsibility has a significant 
positive influence on an employee’s intention to 
violate company security policies. Furthermore, 
Harrington (1996) found that denial of responsibility 
has a significant impact on information system 
employees’ computer abuse intentions and judgments. 
Therefore, based on these considerations, we 
hypothesize: 
H1: Auditors using denial of responsibility are more 
likely to form behavioral intentions to violate 
policy. 
2.1.2 Denial of Injury 
When using denial of injury, the individual justifies 
actions by reasoning that the actions did not cause any 
real harm or damage and the victim can afford any 
harm done (Sykes & Matza 1957). For example, a 
shoplifter in a large retailer may rationalize an action 
because the retailer can handle the loss. A nurse may 
violate a hospital’s privacy policy by reading a 
celebrity’s medical chart, but if it is motivated only by 
curiosity and no data are distributed (no breach), then 
no tangible harm is experienced and the nurse may 
neutralize the policy violation in this manner. An 
auditor may rationalize reporting fewer billable hours 
than actually worked because the client’s bill will be 
lower and the auditing firm will likely retain the 
client’s services in the future because of the auditor’s 
perceived efficiency. Similarly, computer criminals 
may justify their actions by claiming that they are just 
hacking hardware and are not causing any harm to 
individuals, or workers may feel that they can skip 
security procedures if they feel that the steps are 
unnecessary. In the context of IS security, Siponen and 
Vance (2010) have found denial of injury to have a 
significant impact on employee intentions to violate 
information security policies. Therefore, based on 
these considerations, we hypothesize: 
H2: Auditors using denial of injury are more likely to 
form behavioral intentions to violate policy. 
2.1.3 Defense of Necessity 
When using defense of necessity, the offender justifies 
that rule-breaking is necessary and that there is no 
reason to feel guilty about the action (Minor, 1981). 
Starving individuals steal food to survive. The 
healthcare literature often cites examples of how 
medical caregivers employ various workarounds in 
order to provide timely and effective patient care, even 
if these workarounds violate security policies. Koppel 
et al., (2012) offer the example of a nurse charged with 
matching the barcode on the patient’s wrist (which 
calls for a 10m dose) with the barcode on medications 
dispensed by the hospital pharmacy (which filled the 
prescription with two separate 5mg doses). The 
barcodes do not match, generating an error code 
requiring a time-consuming report. However, to 
provide the dose and move on to the next patient, the 
nurse proceeds to violate a security procedure in the 
interest of time. Puhakainen (2006) reports that 
employees claim they must ignore policies to meet 
deadlines. For example, an employee may argue that it 
is necessary to share a password with a coworker in 
certain circumstances in order to perform job duties. 
Barlow et al. (2018) give the example of an employee 
who gets an urgent call from a coworker facing a 
deadline who needs information saved on the hard 
drive of an office computer with no remote access; 
thus, the caller shares the password needed to access 
the information for the report. An auditor may 
rationalize that reporting a lower number of billable 
hours than actually worked because is necessary to 
ensure that the audit team stays on budget. In the 
context of IS security, Siponen and Vance (2010) 
found that the defense of necessity positively 
correlates with the intention to violate company 
security policies. Therefore, based on these 
considerations, we hypothesize: 
H3: Auditors using the defense of necessity are more 
likely to form behavioral intentions to violate 
policy. 
2.1.4 Appeal to Higher Loyalties 
When using the technique of appeal to higher loyalties, 
the violator justifies the offense by advocating that it is 
for the greater good of society (Sykes & Matza 1957). 
More specifically, an individual might sacrifice the 
demands or the social norms of the larger society in 
favor of a smaller social group, such as a gang, family, 
or a circle of friends. For example, individuals might 
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argue that it is necessary to steal money in order to feed 
one’s family. LaBeff et al. (1990) investigated how 
students who cheat have used neutralization techniques 
to suppress the guilt. Their results suggest that students 
appeal to higher loyalties by simply stating that helping 
friends matters more than not cheating. Auditors might 
rationalize reporting a lower number of billable hours 
than actually worked in order to help their supervisors 
manage efficient teams. In the IS security context, 
Siponen and Vance (2010) found that the appeal to 
higher loyalties has a significant influence on an 
employee’s intention to violate the company security 
policy. Therefore, based on these considerations, we 
hypothesize: 
H4: Auditors using the appeal to higher loyalties are 
more likely to form behavioral intentions to 
violate policy. 
2.1.5 Metaphor of the Ledger 
This particular neutralization technique works by 
balancing certain good acts with bad acts. Klockars 
(1976) suggests that when individuals believe they 
have performed enough good deeds to compensate for 
one or two bad deeds, they may engage in deviant 
behaviors without guilt. In such situations, individuals 
might focus on the criminal act itself as compensation 
for good deeds previously performed (Piquero et al., 
2005). Willison et al. (2018) discuss an employee who 
felt he had been such a model employee for so long that 
it would be alright to violate the computer security 
policy (stealing his boss’s password to see everyone’s 
raises) just one time. An auditor may rationalize 
reporting a lower number of billable hours than 
actually worked since the extra work performed 
resulted in the discovery of an error that, when 
corrected, resulted in the financial statements being 
reported in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles. In the context of IS security, 
Siponen and Vance (2010) found that the metaphor of 
the ledger has a significant positive effect on 
employees’ intentions to violate company security 
policies. Another study conducted by Hollinger (1991) 
examined the effect of the metaphor of the ledger along 
with three other neutralization techniques in 
production deviance and workplace theft. Their results 
revealed a positive correlation between the metaphor 
of the ledger and production deviance. Therefore, 
based on these considerations, we hypothesize: 
H5: Auditors using the metaphor of the ledger are 
more likely to form behavioral intentions to 
violate policy. 
2.2  Deterrence Theory 
Deterrence theory suggests that employees rationally 
violate policies if the perceived benefits outweigh the 
risks. This cognitive appraisal process results in 
reduced motivation to engage in rule-breaking 
behavior if individuals believe that the risk of getting 
caught is high (certainty of sanctions), that severe 
penalties will be applied if they are caught (severity of 
sanctions), and/or that punishment will be swift 
(celerity of sanctions). In the deterrence literature, 
studies utilizing sanction celerity have produced 
inconclusive results (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001); 
further, they have found sanction certainty to be more 
effective in deterring deviant behavior than sanction 
severity or sanction celerity (Pogarsky, 2002). Nagin 
and Pogarsky (2001) further establish this notion by 
indicating that the theory “does not concern a 
‘connection’ between behavior and consequences, but 
rather whether potential consequences already 
recognized by the decision-maker seem sufficiently 
‘costly’ to deter behavior” (p. 867). Echoing this, 
Raddatz et al. (2020) found that sanction severity and 
sanction certainty have the strongest influence on 
computer usage policy compliance intentions, whereas 
the authors did not find that sanction celerity had any 
influence. Similarly, Nagin and Pogarsky (2001) found 
that sanction celerity did not have an impact on 
deterring drunk driving. 
This referent theory has been widely applied in 
information security research, especially in terms of 
the roles of perceived sanction severity and certainty 
(D’Arcy & Herath, 2011). Straub and Nance (1990) 
suggest that the detection and punishment of violators 
can minimize computer abuse. Similarly, Straub 
(1990) found that the use of information security 
deterrents results in a decreased incidence of computer 
abuse. Straub and Welke (1998) implemented an 
action research study in which they highlight the 
importance of communicating the certainty and 
severity of sanctions as a part of insider education and 
training programs in order to minimize security 
violations. Kankanhalli et al. (2003) investigated the 
use of sanctions to enhance information security and 
found that deterrents lead to the improved 
effectiveness of information security. 
Straub et al. (1993) further applied deterrence theory 
in a field experiment and concluded that 
communicating sanctions to employees can reduce the 
likelihood of insider information security violations. 
Harrington (1996) found that codes of ethics, a type of 
formal sanction applied to the organization 
generically, do not affect insiders’ judgments or 
intentions to commit computer abuse. However, 
generic codes of ethics were found to affect insiders 
that ranked high in the denial of responsibility, which 
is a form of rationalization. Similarly, IS-specific 
codes of ethics did not affect judgment or intentions, 
except in the case of computer sabotage, which is a 
severe type of computer abuse. Thus, the effects of 
codes of ethics were found to be “sporadic and weak” 
(Harrington, 1996, p. 273). D’Arcy et al. (2009) found 
that IS security policies, awareness programs, and 
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computer monitoring influence the perceived severity 
of formal sanctions, which leads to the reduced 
intention to misuse IS. In their study, the certainty of 
formal sanctions did not have any effect on intentions 
to misuse IS. However, Siponen et al. (2007) applied 
both formal and informal sanctions to explain insiders’ 
compliance with information security policy and found 
that both forms of sanctions predict insiders’ 
compliance with IS security policies. D’Arcy and 
Devaraj (2012) later found that both forms of sanctions 
have direct and indirect influence on the intentions to 
misuse technology. Thus, although the results of 
previous studies are mixed and opinions are diverse 
regarding the definitive role of sanctions on 
information security compliance intentions and 
behaviors (D’Arcy & Herath, 2011), the overall 
research stream supports the adaptation of deterrence 
theory from criminology to the information systems 
context. 
Several information security researchers have used 
deterrence theory to predict deviant and conforming 
user behavior in the IS security context (D’Arcy & 
Herath, 2011; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007; D’Arcy et al., 
2009; Peace et al., 2003; Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
However, the relationships between the correlations of 
sanction severity and certainty toward behavioral 
intentions are not consistent among the studies. For 
example, Peace et al. (2003) found sanction certainty 
and severity to have a significant impact on the 
individual’s attitude toward software piracy, whereas 
D’Arcy et al. (2009) found that sanction severity has a 
significant impact on reducing IS misuse intentions but 
sanction certainty’s impact is insignificant. 
Furthermore, Herath and Rao (2009) used protection 
motivation theory and deterrence theory to investigate 
employee security policy compliance and found the 
certainty of detection has a positive impact, whereas 
the severity of penalty has a negative impact on 
security policy compliance intentions. Because of the 
inconsistent nature of the findings based on deterrence 
theory and the lack of studies conducted in information 
security research on auditor standards violations, we 
used two major components of deterrence theory in our 
research to test the antecedents of unethical auditor 
behavior resulting in policy violations: sanction 
severity and sanction certainty. Based on these 
research findings on the application of deterrence 
theory, we hypothesize: 
H6: When faced with high sanction severity, auditors 
are less likely to form behavioral intentions to 
violate policy. 
H7: When faced with high sanction certainty, auditors 
are less likely to form behavioral intentions to 
violate policy. 
2.3  Degree of Violation 
If an external auditor finds that significant weaknesses 
exist in internal controls during the course of fieldwork, 
the auditor is required to include those weaknesses in the 
working papers. However, an audit supervisor may ask 
the auditor to remove the deficiencies from the working 
papers or minimize the references to the control 
deficiencies for various reasons. First and foremost, 
under the current external audit recruitment system, the 
client organization has the full authority to hire and fire 
the auditors that they recruit to audit their financial 
statements. Under this commonly accepted method, it 
has become a well-known practice for organizations to 
fire external auditing firms that deliver unfavorable 
audits. Thus, auditors are highly motivated to remain in 
the client’s good graces by delivering favorable results. 
Second, an external auditor’s future career may depend 
on the potential success with a current client 
organization, which further increases the motivation to 
provide favorable audit results (Bazerman et al. 2002). 
However, to the extent that more extreme sanctions are 
more commonly present for violations of auditing 
standards, auditors might be torn between violating 
auditor standards to some degree in order to deliver 
favorable results to their clients and avoid potential 
punishment.   
For the context of this study, we investigate what an 
auditor conducting fieldwork would do if a supervisor 
asked the auditor to make modifications to the internal 
control deficiencies reported in the working papers. An 
auditor likely perceives different degrees of violation 
intensity, based on whether the auditor is asked to 
remove deficiencies or merely minimize them, which 
likely influences the auditor’s intention to violate policy. 
Thus, when faced with the decision to modify internal 
control deficiencies reported in working papers, an 
auditor may weigh the costs and benefits of such a 
violation. Because of the severe sanctions associated 
with an auditor’s failure to comply with the Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards along with the internal 
pressure to retain clients through rendering favorable 
audit results, an auditor may resort to performing the 
lesser violation. Hence, when faced with more serious 
violations that could result in career-ending 
consequences, auditors may be less likely to form the 
behavioral intentions to violate policy. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
H8: When faced with a high degree of violation 
intensity, auditors are less likely to form 
behavioral intentions to violate policy. 
2.4  The Techniques of Neutralization 
and Deterrence Effects 
While deterrence through sanctions is effective in 
mitigating or eliminating deviant behavior, techniques 
of neutralization allow offenders to minimize feelings 
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of guilt or shame by rationalizing their actions. In the 
context of information security research, scholars have 
utilized deterrence theory as a means to explain an 
individual’s intention to violate information security-
related policies. However, even in the presence of 
severe sanctions, individuals may engage in deviant 
behavior, such as violating organizational policies. The 
theory of neutralization from the field of criminology 
presents “techniques of neutralization” used by 
potential violators to overcome the impact of 
organizational sanctions proposed by deterrence 
theory. Extant literature in the field of information 
security has explored the impact of deterrence and 
neutralization through investigating the intention to 
violate IS security policy (Barlow et al., 2013; Siponen 
& Vance, 2010), intention to use shadow IT (Silic et 
al., 2017), and employee computer abuse (Willison et 
al., 2018).  
Siponen and Vance (2010) explored the impact of 
deterrence in the specific form of formal and informal 
sanctions along with six neutralization techniques 
(defense of necessity, appeal to higher loyalties, 
condemnation of the condemners, metaphor of the 
ledger, denial of injury, and denial of responsibility) 
and their impact on intention to violate IS security 
policy. Their results indicate that both formal and 
informal sanctions have an insignificant influence in 
the presence of neutralization. These findings can be 
attributed to the fact that, when the severity of 
punishment for policy violations is not severe enough 
to deter employees, employees may easily rationalize 
their guilt, shame, and all other components of 
sanctions through neutralization techniques.  
In a similar vein, Willison et al. (2018) explored the 
impact of distributive and procedural justice on 
computer abuse and the effect of formal sanctions, as 
well as techniques of neutralization and their 
moderating effects on the relationship between 
organizational justice and intentions to abuse 
computers. Their findings indicate that procedural 
justice influences abuse intentions and that sanction 
certainty and techniques of neutralization moderate 
this influence. Thus, it can be inferred that the 
influence of sanctions and neutralization may be 
context-dependent, whereas the successful 
implementation of sanctions is highly dependent on 
factors such as the organization’s ability to enforce 
punishments with certainty, employees’ awareness of 
such punishments, and the seriousness of the violation 
under consideration.  
In the context of our study, given that auditors belong 
to a special category of employees who are required to 
abide by various rules and regulations such as the 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, the 
Statements on Auditing Standards, and the AICPA 
Code of Professional Conduct, the same organizational 
interventions (e.g., sanctions) and the same 
neutralization techniques may or may not be similarly 
effective. Furthermore, because of the more extreme 
sanctions faced by auditors, they may or may not 
rationalize their actions through the use of 
neutralization techniques. Therefore, this study seeks 
to contribute to the existing information security 
literature by testing the impact of sanctions and 
neutralization.  
3 Method 
Insiders who abuse their information access privileges 
must be identified, but the research instruments for 
adequate insider threat research data collection and 
measurement are unfortunately limited and largely 
ineffective (Crossler et al., 2013; Warkentin, Straub et 
al., 2012). This lack of effective mechanisms and data 
for studying the insider threat phenomenon 
undermines the ability to defend organizational assets 
against internal perpetrators. For our study, we used a 
widely used scientific technique known as the 
scenario-based factorial survey method, which has 
been employed by criminologists (Jasso, 2006; Taylor, 
2006) and information security researchers (Barlow et 
al., 2013; Barlow et al., 2018; Johnston et al., 2016; 
Trinkle et al., 2014; Vance et al., 2013; Vance et al., 
2015; Willison et al., 2018), to collect data for our 
investigation. Scenario-based methods are a common 
means of assessing behaviors that are antisocial and/or 
ethical/unethical in nature (Siponen & Vance, 2010) 
because of their ability to elicit forthright responses 
from study participants who might otherwise feel 
vulnerable to potential retribution for honestly 
disclosing their actions. By asking respondents to read 
a scenario and imagine themselves in the context of the 
scenario’s character, the researcher can establish a 
reliable and valid measure for behavioral intention as 
it relates to the various factors found in the scenario, 
even though the behavior may be socially undesirable.  
Factorial survey instruments are scenario-based 
instruments that randomly provide participants with 
multiple versions of a realistic scenario that randomly 
varies the situational information (the tested factors) 
with the remainder of the scenario being fixed (Taylor, 
2006), thus yielding a crossed experimental design 
(Jasso & Rossi 1977). This technique provides a 
realistically complex instrument (Lyons, 2008), with 
approximately orthogonal factors (Lyons, 2008; Rossi 
& Anderson, 1982), and the details distributed across 
participants (Trinkle et al., 2014; Warkentin, McBride 
et al., 2012). This technique combines a variety of 
aspects used in field surveys with the control and 
orthogonality offered by experimental design (Jasso, 
2006; Rossi & Anderson, 1982). Furthermore, by 
inviting our participants to put themselves in the role 
of the scenario character, the factorial survey method 
enables the collection of norm-violating intentions 
with little influence of social desirability bias. For our 
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factorial survey study, participants received three 
randomly selected unique variations (scenarios) of a 
vignette that we developed, in which the degree of 
violation, technique of neutralization, and level of 
deterrence were manipulated. According to Willison et 
al (2012, p. 277): “Because of the recommended 
practice among factorial survey experiments of 
removing unrealistic, contextually invalid, or logically 
impossible scenarios from the full population of 
scenario versions (Jasso 2006), the chance of 
multicollinearity among predictor variables 
(dimensions) in a model does not remain zero, but in 
all likelihood does remain quite small.” The 
development of the instrument, the participant pool, 
and the independent and dependent variables are 
discussed in the remainder of this section. 
We provided our respondents with a written 
description of a realistic situation (vignette) in which 
various factors were manipulated and the scenario 
character was told to violate policy, which could lead 
to extreme sanctions, including losing professional 
certification, thereby ending one’s career. Respondents 
may hesitate to report true intentions in traditional 
surveys despite the assurance of anonymity. However, 
when respondents answer from the perspective of a 
scenario character, the widely adopted research 
presumption is that social desirability bias (or 
acquiescence bias) is minimized and respondents are 
more likely to provide honest answers regarding the 
vignette. O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) report that 
out of 174 ethical decision-making articles in business 
journals, 55% of these journals employed scenario 
methods of data collection. As the scenario method has 
been used to study issues such as information security 
policy violations (Barlow et al., 2013; Barlow et al., 
2018; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Siponen & Vance, 2010), 
privacy concerns (Malhotra et al., 2004), and media 
choices (Straub & Karahanna, 1998), we used the 
scenario method because it is an appropriate way to 
collect information relating to personal and ethical 
issues such as those studied in this research. 
3.1 Participants 
We collected data from an original sample of 121 
graduate and undergraduate (senior-level) accounting 
students at a large university in the southeast United 
States. Each participant received three randomly 
 
1 Random assignment of the scenarios was used to control for 
any order-effects bias. We use mixed-model analysis to 
develop the models to test our hypotheses, as mixed-model 
analysis addresses the lack of independence associated with 
the use of multiple measures from the same participant 
(Vance et al., 2013). 
2 The manipulation check, as shown in Appendix C, asked 
the participants to identify if the supervisor in the scenario 
told “Joe” (the character they are playing) to remove or 
modify the references to the control deficiencies regarding 
selected unique scenarios, yielding 363 possible 
complete responses.1 Of the 363 possible cases, 59 
were removed from the data set because of incomplete 
survey responses or failing a manipulation check 
(from participants who may have skimmed through 
the instrument), yielding 304 valid response cases 
from 104 participants. Of the cases that were removed, 
45 were incomplete and 14 failed the manipulation 
check.2 
We specifically chose accounting students as an 
appropriate sampling frame for this project for several 
reasons. Information system auditing is an activity 
that crosses functional boundaries between IS and 
auditing. Although the security issues of the 
accounting information systems in a company are a 
concern for both IT and accounting, and although both 
information systems auditors and (internal and 
external) financial auditors are involved in the audit 
process, only external auditors are mandated to audit 
the information system and report on any weaknesses 
(such as security issues) during the financial statement 
audit. IS students do not typically learn about 
financial statement audit working papers nor do they 
learn that modifying them could be a high-sanction 
violation that could end their career. However, all 
accounting students in our subject pool absolutely 
understood that this was an extreme sanction situation. 
Accounting students are taught in auditing courses 
(which all participants had previously taken) that 
altering working papers to remove or minimize 
significant or material weaknesses discovered during 
an audit may be considered fraud (significant 
weaknesses) or an act that discredits the profession 
(immaterial weaknesses) and may result in the 
revocation of their license as a certified public 
accountant by their state board of accountancy. In 
other words, any scenario we developed that was 
appropriate for IS students would not have contained 
this critical element of our investigation—i.e., merely 
being fired from a job is not as severe as losing one’s 
professional license. Our focal research phenomenon 
required the perspective of a certified public 
accountant, as they face extreme sanctions for 
violations of ethical standards, which is a primary 
research question of this project. 
the Triple Point AIS package from the working papers. All 
of the participants in the experiment had at least one auditing 
course(s)in which learned the significance of the working 
papers and the possible consequences of altering the working 
papers. Therefore, they would understand the meaningful 
differences between removing and minimizing information 
from the working papers and that altering the working papers 
may be considered as an act discreditable to the profession, 
which may lead to a state board of accountancy revoking 
their CPA license. 
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The original participant pool consisted of 122 students, 
of which one declined to participate, resulting in a 
99.2% response rate. Each of these students had 
previously passed multiple courses that included 
discussion about ethics and in which they were taught 
that violations like the one described in our scenario 
could result in them losing their professional 
certification. 
Evidence supports sampling from student populations, 
in general (Compeau et al., 2012; Gordon et al., 1986). 
More specifically, prior research has used students in 
accounting and financial fraud settings and has found 
them to be acceptable subjects (Betz et al., 1989; Stanga 
& Turpen, 1991). Frequently, entry-level auditors 
perform tests of accounting information system 
controls; therefore, the use of students as a sampling 
frame is appropriate, as the experimental scenario is in 
an information systems audit setting.  
Graduate students comprised 21.2% (22) of the 
participants, and 78.8% (82) were undergraduate 
students. Approximately 32% percent (33) of the 
participants in the study had internships. Men made up 
51% (53) of the participants, and 49% (51) of the 
participants were women. The majority of the 
participants were in the age groups of 18-21 (50) and 22-
29 (49). The results from testing for differences in 
responses across the two age groups did not indicate a 
significant difference in means of the dependent 
variable (t = 0.995, p-value = 0.32). Therefore, age was 
not included in the model. 
3.2 Expert Review Panel and Pre-Test 
Content validity for the scenario, its various 
manipulations, and the behavioral intent scale was 
verified via an exhaustive literature review and an expert 
review panel consisting of subject matter experts and 
experts in survey instrument design. An expert panel of 
three experienced accounting researchers examined the 
experimental material prior to pre-testing. The panel 
attested to the readability, understandability, and realism 
of the instrument. We incorporated several of their 
suggestions into the instrument prior to pre-testing. 
To further validate our instrument, a sample of 24 
graduate accounting students who had held internships 
participated in a formal pre-test of the instrument, 
including the various scenario versions. These 
participants judged the instrument to be readable, 
understandable, and realistic with respect to the tasks of 
an entry-level auditor. 
3.3 Instrument 
To thoroughly examine the focal phenomenon, we 
developed an online instrument on www.qualtrics.com 
to investigate the factors influencing an auditor’s 
behavioral intention to violate policy. The experiment 
used a factorial survey method design (Rossi & Nock, 
1982) with three manipulated factors. The manipulated 
factors included the degree of violation, techniques of 
neutralization used, and level of deterrence. 
The scenario used in the present study is a modified 
version of the “Alice and the ABC Company” case, 
originally developed by Thorne (2000, p. 157). The 
original version of the case has been successfully used 
in Ge and Thomas (2008), Earley and Kelly (2004), 
and Thorne et al. (2003). We modified the case to 
conform to the style of the factorial survey method and 
our research questions. Appendix B contains the entire 
instrument, with a scenario shell, the factors and their 
manipulations, the dependent variables, and 
demographic questions. We also present a sample 
scenario version in Appendix C. 
3.4 Variables 
3.4.1 Independent Variables 
The degree of violation is a bivariate manipulation that 
asked participants to (1) remove all of the references to 
control deficiencies regarding the accounting information 
system from the report, or to (2) minimize the references 
to control deficiencies regarding the accounting 
information system from the report.  
We manipulated the use of the techniques of 
neutralization in six ways: (1) no technique of 
neutralization used. Or, a statement relating to (2) 
denial of responsibility, (3) denial of injury, (4) 
defense of necessity, (5) appeal to higher loyalties, or 
(6) metaphor of the ledger. Table 1 presents each 
independent variable. The option of no technique of 
neutralization was given to provide a control group. 
This variable was omitted from the analysis in order to 
provide coefficients, z-statistics, and p-values for the 
variables relating to the tested hypotheses. 
The level of deterrence is a four-way manipulation 
with all possible pairs of the following options: 
sanction certainty (likelihood of being caught) was 
either minimal or severe and sanction severity (level of 
punishment) was either minimal or severe. 
3.4.2 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in the current research is the 
likelihood that the participants would behave 
unethically by altering their working papers to 
minimize or reduce references to an information 
system control weakness. The participants provided 
responses to two questions regarding the likelihood of 
violating the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards: 
(1) the likelihood that they would modify the working 
papers (DV1), and (2) the likelihood that another 
auditor in the same situation would modify the 
working papers (DV2).  
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Table 1. Independent Variables 





Techniques of Neutralization 
Denial of responsibility 
Yes H1 (+) Believes that since his supervisor told him to modify 
the report, he has no control over the decision 
Denial of injury 
Yes H2 (+) Believes that no one would be harmed by modifying 
the report 
Defense of necessity 
Yes H3 (+) Believes that if he does not modify the report, his 
firm will lose [client name] as a client 
Appeal to higher loyalties 
Yes H4 (+) Believes that modifying the report would not be as 
bad as modifying the financial statement numbers 
Metaphor of the ledger 
Yes H5 (+) Believes that all her past reports were appropriate, 
so it would be OK to modify the report just this one 
time 
(No technique of 
neutralization) 
No  This item would not have been in the scenario. 
Deterrence theory 
Low sanction certainty, 
low sanction severity 
No  Believes that her chances of being caught are low, 
but if caught, the punishment would be minimal 
Low sanction certainty, 
high sanction severity 
Yes H6 (-) Believes that her chances of being caught are low, 
but if caught, the punishment would be severe 
High sanction certainty, 
low sanction severity 
Yes H7 (-) Believes that her chances of being caught are high, 
and if caught, the punishment would be minimal 
High sanction certainty, 
high sanction severity 
Yes H6 & H7 (-) Believes that her chances of being caught are high, 
and if caught, the punishment would be severe 
Degree of violation 
Degree of violation: high Yes H8 (-) 
 
Remove all of the references to control deficiencies 
regarding the [software co. name] AIS package from 
the report 
Degree of violation: low No  Minimize the references to control deficiencies 
regarding the [software co. name] AIS package from 
the report 
Note: * One of the underlying assumptions of mixed-model analysis requires that none of the independent variables in the model be linear 
combinations of other independent variables in the model. Therefore, in order to test our hypotheses and the underlying theories using mixed- 
model analysis, we retained all of the variables where a technique of neutralization was present, sanction certainty and/or sanction severity were 
high, and where the degree of violation was high.  
Fully anchored 5-point Likert-type scales, which ranged 
from 1 = definitely would not modify the working papers 
to 5 = definitely would modify the working papers, were 
used to capture participants’ responses. The responses to 
the two likelihood questions were averaged to yield the 
dependent variable (DVAVE). This two-item technique 
reduces the social desirability response bias associated 
with asking only for the likelihood that the participant 
would personally modify the working papers (Chung & 
Monroe 2003; Cuixia, 2003; Robinson, 2012; Trinkle et 
al. 2014). 
3.4.3 Control Variables and Other 
Manipulations 
We controlled for possible differences within the 
sample through several control variables. As 
previously discussed, the sample contained both 
graduate and undergraduate students. Though Stanga 
and Turpen (1991) and Betz et al. (1989) both used 
graduate and undergraduate students as samples, 
neither study presented any results indicating a 
difference between undergraduate and graduate 
students in terms of moral decision-making. However, 
we would expect that graduate students would have a 
better understanding of the ethical expectations of the 
accounting profession because they would have likely 
taken more courses with audit and ethics components, 
leading to the expectation that as they progress through 
their education, they would be less likely to behave 
unethically. Therefore, we controlled for graduate and 
undergraduate status with a dummy variable. We 
expect the same to be the case with those students who 
have participated in an internship, as they would have 
likely gained firsthand experience of auditors 
navigating ethical decisions. Thus, we also controlled 
for completion of an internship with a dummy variable. 
Prior research is mixed on the differences between how 
men and women respond to decisions of moral 
judgment. Betz et al. (1989) and Stanga and Turpen 
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(1991) find that men and women respond differently. 
However, Rest (1986) found no difference across 
genders. The lack of consensus in the extant research 
led to the inclusion of gender as a control variable in 
the current study. 
To control for possible biased reactions to nontested 
items in the scenario, we manipulated several other 
factors. We randomly manipulated the gender of the 
main character, the client’s name, the software 
company’s name, and the firm’s name. An expert panel 
of behavioral researchers examined the list of client, 
company, and firm names and found them to be free of 
possible regional biases and frivolity.3 
4 Results 
We conducted a mixed-model analysis to generate 
results for the hypothesis testing. The mixed-model 
technique was used because of the associated lack of 
independence (Vance et al. 2013) of the participants 
considering multiple scenarios; mixed-modeling 
adjusts for the correlation associated with repeated 
measures. The mixed command in Stata 14 was used 
to generate the linear mixed-model results. Further, we 
conducted a relative-weight analysis (Johnson, 2000). 
Relative-weight analysis determines the proportionate 
contribution that each variable contributes to the model 
R2 by considering both the direct effect of each 
variable and its joint effect with other variables in the 
model (Johnson, 2000). Table 2 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. The 
Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) of 0.885 supports 
the reliability of the scale of the dependent variable. 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for the 
variables. All correlations are less than 0.70, thus 
multicollinearity is not an issue. We expected that the 
degree of violation variable (RM1) would have been 
better correlated to the deterrence theory variables 
(DT2, DT3, and DT4), as one would expect that, as the 
severity of the violation increases, the severity of the 
penalty would also increase. The correlations in the 
current study may be an indication that the participants 
viewed both violations as equally severe since both are 
considered fraud, and auditors are taught that fraud is 
unethical and may result in severe punishment. 
We used the Shapiro-Francia test to test the normality 
of the continuous dependent variables. The tests 
showed that DV1 (z = 4.03, p-value<0.01) was not 
normally distributed, while DV2 (z = 0.84, p-value = 
0.2) and DVAVE (z = 1.11, p-value = 0.13) were 
normally distributed. Therefore, DVAVE meets the 
normality assumption of mixed-model analysis for 
 
3 The client, company, and firm names were randomly selected 
from the following list: Crossroads, Inc., Newline Company, 
Everlast Industries, Paxton, Inc., True Blue Corporation, 4th 
Street Company, Sunset Industries, Century Corporation, Triple 
continuous variables and was used in an unaltered state 
in the model testing. The remaining variables are 
binary and not subject to the normality assumption. 
Further analysis of the responses to DV1 and DV2 
yielded interesting findings regarding a possible social 
desirability bias. The results of a Pearson chi-square 
test (chi-square = 97.56, p-value < 0.01) and the two-
sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z = 12.76, p-value < 
0.01) indicate that social desirability bias is likely to 
exist, as the median value for DV1 is significantly 
lower than the median value of DV2. Non-parametric 
tests were used because DV1 was not being normally 
distributed.  
Furthermore, 76.6% (233/304) of the observations 
contained responses to DV1 that were lower than the 
matched responses for DV2. This finding indicates that 
social desirability bias may have been involved in the 
participants’ responses to the likelihood that they would 
modify the working papers (DV1). Of the 24.4% 
(71/304) of the observations that did not indicate a 
possible social desirability bias, 58 (19.1% of 304) 
provided identical responses for both DV1 and DV2, 
while 13 (4.3% of 304) provided responses indicating 
that the responding participant was more likely to 
modify the working papers than another auditor in the 
same situation. 
4.1 Hypothesis Testing 
To evaluate the results of the data collection, we first 
evaluated each hypothesis individually. Subsequently, 
we performed a relative-weight analysis to determine 
which factors contribute the most to the R2 value. 
4.1.1 Individual Items 
H1-H5 concern the effectiveness of techniques of 
neutralization on influencing an auditor’s behavioral 
intention to violate policy. H6 and H7 address the effects 
of deterrence theory. H8 concerns the degree of 
violation. Table 4 presents the results of the mixed-
model analysis for the significance of the individual 
hypotheses. The results suggest that the neutralization 
technique denial of responsibility (TN1) (z = 2.13, p-
value < 0.05) significantly contributes to the likelihood 
that the participants would form the intention to behave 
unethically. Thus, H1 is supported. The remaining 
neutralization techniques, denial injury (H2), defense of 
necessity (H3), appeal to higher loyalties (H4), and 
metaphor of the ledger (H5), do not significantly 
contribute to the participants’ likelihood of forming 
intentions to behave unethically.4 Thus, the results do 
not support these hypotheses. 
Point Enterprises, Dynamic Corporation, Agile Industries, 
Creative Corp., Parker Enterprises, Freeland Enterprises, Aspire 
Enterprises, and Peak Industries. 
4 One-tailed p-values are used for hypothesis testing. 
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Table 2. Descreptive Statistics 
Panel A: Participant-specific statistics 
Variable Frequency Percentage 
Age group   
     18-21 50 48.1% 
     22-29 49 47.1% 
     30-39 2 1.9% 
     40-49 2 1.9% 
     50-59 1 1.0% 
Gender   
     Male 53 51.0% 
     Female 51 49.0% 
Student classification   
     Graduate student 22 21.2% 
     Undergraduate student 82 78.8% 
Internship   
     Yes 33 31.7% 
     No 71 68.3% 
N= 104   
Panel B: Dependent variable 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
DV1 2.07 1.157 1 5 
DV2 3.42 1.123 1 5 
DVAVE 2.75 0.098 1 5 
Note: N = 304. DV1 = The likelihood that the participant would behave unethically in the given situation,. 
DV2 = The likelihood that others in the given situation would behave unethically. DVAVE = Average of the likelihood that the participant and 
others in the same situation would behave unethically. 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 DVAVG TN1 TN2 TN3  TN4 TN5 DT2 DT3 DT4 RM1 Gender Internship Grad 
DVAVG 1              
TN1 0.112* 1             
TN2 -0.064 -0.179** 1            
TN3 0.102 -0.162** -0.187*** 1           
TN4 -0.045 -0.188*** -0.216*** -0.195***  1         
TN5 0.036 -0.173** -0.199*** -0.180**  -0.208*** 1        
DT2 -0.043 0.039 0.129* -0.201***  0.006 -0.109 1       
DT3 -0.018 -0.208*** 0.142** 0.033  0.244*** -0.231*** -0.285*** 1      
DT4 -0.257** -0.061 0.035 0.167**  -0.145** 0.092 -0.302*** -0.293*** 1     
RM1 0.048 0.016 0.117* 0.102  -0.377*** 0.181** 0.028 -0.013 -0.072 1    
Gender -0.033 0.021 0.026 -0.158**  0.025 -0.107 0.076 0.053 -0.119* -0.018 1   
Internship 0.088 0.045 -0.005 0.045  -0.009 0.033 -0.060 -0.097 0.092 -0.091 -0.333*** 1  
Grad -0.057 0.036 -0.017 -0.003  0.050 -0.092 -0.006 0.065 0.059 -0.039 -0.132* 0.303*** 1 
Note: N = 304, * Significant at the 0.05 level ** Significant at the 0.01 level *** Significant at the 0.001 level 
TN1 = Denial of Responsibility, TN2 = Denial of injury, TN3 = Defense of necessity, TN4 = Appeal to higher loyalties 
TN5 = Metaphor of the ledger, DT2 = Sanction certainty is low and sanction severity is high, DT3 = Sanction certainty is high and sanction severity is low,  
DT4 = Sanction certainty is high and sanction severity is high,   
RM1 = Degree of Violation where 1 = remove all of the references and 0 = minimized all references 
Grad = Dummy variable where 1 = graduate student and 0 = undergraduate student, Gender = Dummy variable where 1 = male and 0 = female 
Internship = Dummy variable where 1 = participated in an internship and 0 = did not participate in an internship 
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Table 4. Mixed Model Analysis Results for the Individual Impact of Magnitude of Alteration, Techniques of 
Neutralization, and Deterrence Theory on an Auditor’s Behavioral Intention to Violate Policy 
 Predicted Sign Beta Z 
(Constant) n/a 3.13 16.79** 
TN1 + 0.36 2.13* 
TN2 + 0.02 0.18 
TN3 + 0.22 1.42 
TN4 + 0.16 1.17 
TN5 + 0.01 0.06 
DT2 - -0.54 -4.13** 
DT3 - -0.41 -3.44** 
DT4 - -1.06 -9.16** 
RM1 - -0.14 -1.33 
Grad - -0.10 -0.50 
Gender n/a -0.07 -0.42 
Internship - 0.20 1.09 
Note: N=304, R2 = 0.16, * Significant at the 0.05 level, ** Significant at the 0.001 level 
TN1 = Denial of responsibility, TN2 = Denial of injury 
TN3 = Defense of necessity, TN4 = Appeal to higher loyalties,TN5 = Metaphor of the ledger,  
DT2 = Sanction certainty is low and sanction severity is high,DT3 = Sanction certainty is high and sanction severity is low,  
DT4 = Sanction certainty is high and sanction severity is high 
RM1 = Degree of violation where 1 = remove all of the references and 0 = minimized all references 
Grad = Dummy variable where 1 = graduate student and 0 = undergraduate student, Gender = Dummy variable where 1 = male and 0 = female 
Internship = Dummy variable where 1 = participated in an internship, and 0 = did not participate in an internship 
Table 5. Relative Weight Analysis 
 Raw Relative Weights Relative Weights as a Percentage of R2 
TN1 0.013 8.3% 
TN2 0.001 0.5% 
TN3 0.017 11.3% 
TN4 0.001 0.8% 
TN5 0.003 2.3% 
DT2 0.010 6.5% 
DT3 0.006 4.0% 
DT4 0.085 56.6% 
RM1 0.001 0.6% 
Grad 0.004 2.5% 
Gender 0.001 0.6% 
Internship 0.009 5.9% 
Note: R2 = 0.15, TN1 = Denial of Responsibility, TN2 = Denial of Injury, TN3 = Defense of Necessity, TN4 = Appeal to a Higher Loyalties 
TN5 = Metaphor of the ledger, DT2 = Sanction certainty is low and sanction severity is high 
DT3 = Sanction certainty is high and sanction severity is low, DT4 = Sanction certainty is high and sanction severity is high 
RM1 = Degree of violation where 1 = remove all of the references and 0 = minimized all references 
Grad = Dummy variable where 1 = graduate student and 0 = undergraduate student, Gender = Dummy variable where 1 = male and 0 = female 
Internship = Dummy variable where 1 = participated in an internship and 0 = did not participate in an internship 
H6 and H7 address the impact of perceived potential 
certainty and severity of the sanctions in terms of 
auditors’ behavioral intention to violate policy, and the 
results support both hypotheses. The results suggest that 
high severity of sanctions combined with low certainty 
of sanctions significantly contributes to the reduction of 
the participants’ likelihood of forming intentions to 
behave unethically (H6) (z = -4.13, p < 0.001), as do 
high certainty of sanctions combined with low severity 
of sanctions (H7) (z = -3.44, p-value < 0.001), making it 
less likely that the participants would behave 
unethically. High certainty of sanctions accompanied 
with high severity of sanctions yielded results that 
provide further support for H6 and H7, since the results 
for this combination (H7) (z = -9.16, p-value < 0.001) 
have a significant negative relation with the participants’ 
likelihood of forming intentions to behave unethically. 
Increasing the degree of violation from minimizing 
references concerning the system control weaknesses to 
removing references concerning the control weakness 
from the working papers did not significantly contribute 
to the participants’ likelihood of forming intentions to 
behave unethically (z = -0.14, p-value = 0.08). Thus, H8 
is not supported. 
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While the R2 value in this study is relatively low (R2 = 
0.15), we believe that the results of this study are 
informative. As discussed by (Hair Jr. et al. 2016), R2 
values are dependent on the model complexity and the 
research discipline; they do not necessarily indicate 
whether a regression model provides an adequate data 
fit. Essentially, R2 values tend to be significantly lower 
for studies that comprise an inherently greater amount 
of unexplainable variation (e.g., studies attempting to 
explain human behavior) in comparison to studies 
predicting physical processes. Thus, the low R2 can be 
attributed to the specific nature of our dependent 
variable (i.e., auditors’ intentions to falsify information), 
which essentially consists of a significant amount of 
unexplainable variation beyond what is explained by the 
neutralization and deterrence theories. 
The results do not indicate significance for any of the 
control variables (university status, gender, or 
participation in an internship). This is interesting 
because we expected that the increased exposure to 
classroom discussions about the importance of ethics in 
the accounting profession, along with witnessing 
professionals ethically practicing accounting during an 
internship, might significantly reduce the participants’ 
likelihood of forming intentions to behave unethically.  
4.1.2 Relative Weight Analysis 
The results of the relative weight analysis (Johnson, 
2000) contained in Table 5 indicate that the presence 
of both high certainty and high severity of sanctions 
(DT4) explain 56.6% of the variance in the 
participants’ likelihood of forming intentions to 
behave unethically. The remainder of the deterrence 
theory variables, DT2 and DT3, explain 6.5% and 
4.0% of the remaining variance, respectively. The most 
important techniques of neutralization, as explained by 
their percentage of explained variance, are defense of 
necessity (11.3%) and denial of responsibility (8.3%). 
Interestingly, two of the techniques of neutralization 
(TN1 and TN3) reversed positions from the mixed- 
model results. This is not unusual, as a variable may 
not be a significant contributor in a mixed-model or 
regression analysis because it is related to another 
variable in the model.  
However, in relative weight analysis, this variable may 
have a large relative weight because the predictable 
variance is distributed across all related variables. The 
opposite may be true for a significant predictor in a 
mixed-model or regression analysis in that its unique 
variance may generate significant results but it may 
have a small relative weight. 
The results of the relative-weight analysis add further 
support to the tested hypotheses, indicating that if the 
participants’ believe that they are not responsible for 
their unethical behavior (H1) and/or that behaving 
unethically is necessary (H3), they are more likely to 
consider behaving unethically. However, in keeping 
with deterrence theory, if the punishment (severity) for 
behaving unethically is high (H6) and/or the likelihood 
of getting caught (certainty) is high (H7), the 
participants are less likely to form intentions to behave 
unethically. 
4.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Because of the differences in DV1 and DV2, we 
performed sensitivity analysis by testing the 
hypotheses on models developed with the individual 
items in the DVAVE construct used as the dependent 
variables. Because DV1 was not being normally 
distributed, we used the log of DV1. The results of the 
two models are very similar to the primary results of 
DVAVE, which are presented in the previous section. 
For the separate models with logDV1 and DV2 as the 
dependent variables, the significance of the 
coefficients of all of the dependent variables are 
identical to the DVAVE results, except that TN1 is no 
longer significant. However, TN1 approaches 
significance in the DV2 model. The change in the 
significance for TN1 illustrates the effect of social 
desirability in the results for the logDV1 model and 
necessitates the need to average DV1 and DV2. 
Appendix D presents the results of the mixed model 
analysis for the sensitivity analysis. 
5 Discussion 
Because auditors behaving unethically is a high-impact 
threat to the security and integrity of corporate 
information, its causes and drivers require careful 
empirical analysis. When auditors choose to modify 
the working papers to avoid reporting irregularities in 
the information system uncovered during an audit, it is 
important to recognize the factors that may contribute 
positively or negatively to such behavior. The results 
of our work contribute to the practical understanding 
of this important phenomenon and provide a research 
foundation for further investigation. 
5.1 Summary of Results 
Our findings show that the technique of denial of 
responsibility influences auditors’ behavioral 
intentions to violate policy (H1 is supported), but the 
use of other techniques is not supported by our 
experimental results (denial injury: H2, defense of 
necessity: H3, appeal to higher loyalties: H4, and 
metaphor of the ledger: H5). Further, we established 
that perceptions of sanction certainty (H6) and severity 
(H7) have a negative influence on the formation of the 
behavioral intention to violate policy, thereby 
establishing the role of punishment as a powerful 
deterrent to unethical behavior resulting in policy 
violation by auditors. Finally, the degree of violation, 
whether it was a serious blatant violation or a relatively 
less deviant one, was not found to matter in the context 
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of our study (H8 is not supported). Overall, we can 
conclude that auditors may justify their unethical 
behavior but the expectation of severe and certain 
punishment can ameliorate this intent. 
5.2 Contribution to Research and Theory 
Our research empirically tested the role of justification 
by auditors, which enables them to rationalize 
unethical behavior, coupled with the impact of 
sanctions on intentions to violate policy. Our results 
highlight the important role that persuasive 
communications can play in influencing auditors to 
avoid behaviors that they know are in clear violation 
of their professional standards of conduct, and which 
are subject to significant professional sanctions. The 
fact that such behaviors continue to be a problem 
means that we must test all causes, and our findings 
offer a tangible contribution to the literature examining 
this phenomenon. We further validate the role of 
sanction severity and sanction certainty, established in 
the extant literature, within the focal phenomenon of 
this study. We investigated the influence of sanctions 
and neutralizations in extreme boundary conditions 
and found that even in these cases, deterrence theory is 
robust and plays a significant role in deterring 
behavioral intentions to violate norms and standards. 
Nevertheless, some techniques of neutralization 
continue to have a significant effect on behavioral 
intentions to violate a policy.  
A conceptual explanation for the combined influence 
of sanctions and neutralization techniques is that, even 
in the presence of extreme punishments, employees 
may ignore sanctions if they feel they can avoid 
detection or if the expected punishment is not severe 
(even if caught). These assumptions can be viewed as 
a means by which employees neutralize their actions 
even in the presence of sanctions. Thus, through the 
techniques of neutralization, employees may eliminate 
guilty feelings or self-blame (Sykes & Matza 1957) 
and may thus defuse the effect of sanctions by 
rationalizing their actions (Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
Sanction severity and certainty could be context-
dependent; some organizations may immediately fire 
employees for policy violations whereas others may 
not. Additionally, for sanctions to be effective, they 
must be perceived as fair and appropriate by 
employees, which further prevents employee backlash 
or other unintended consequences. Thus, it may be 
presumed that while severe sanctions imposed with 
certainty are necessary to minimize policy violations, 
employees may still invoke neutralization techniques 
to rationalize their actions in situations where they 
intend to violate organizational policies. These 
findings provide evidence to support the need to test 
behavioral theory beyond existing boundary 
conditions to determine whether the initial findings are 
robust. Overall, our work empirically establishes the 
finding that cognitive mediating processes can lead 
auditors to either violate policy or reject the temptation 
to do so. 
5.3 Contribution to Practice 
Our findings reveal implications for practice, 
especially regarding the role of organizational levers of 
influence, including sanctions and other persuasive 
communications intended to suppress the influence of 
rationalization and enhance the motivation to comply 
with standards and policies. With respect to the 
significant influence of sanctions on an employee’s 
intention to violate company policy, it can be inferred 
that sanctions mainly serve as a deterrent for 
employees who intend to violate these policies. 
Additionally, organizations can implement sanctions 
as a means of establishing a legal foundation that 
allows the organization to undertake well-defined 
punishments for employees who are caught violating 
organizational policies. Furthermore, perceptions of 
sanction severity and certainty rely on an employee’s 
awareness of the existence of these sanctions. Though 
not tested in this study, we believe that organizations 
can increase employee awareness through 
interventions such as security education, training, and 
awareness programs (SETA). The effectiveness of 
such programs is mainly dependent on the 
organization’s ability to take clearly defined actions 
against employees who violate the policies. Thus, 
sanctions may be only useful to the extent that the 
organization is willing to impose them effectively—
otherwise, sanctions might be counterproductive.  
In the context of our study, the implications suggest 
that employers should be clear and unambiguous about 
the organizational punishment that will be directed 
toward auditors who violate their professional 
standards and violate policy, even if employees may be 
tempted to rationalize or justify their deviant behavior. 
However, because we establish that auditors may 
cognitively rationalize their unethical behaviors, we 
expose the need to address a specific human decision 
process that is subject to external influences. 
Regardless of which neutralization technique (or 
techniques) facilitates specific policy violations, it is 
imperative that organizations proactively endeavor to 
thwart the likelihood of employees seeking to justify 
their actions. 
To the extent that more extreme sanctions are more 
typical in auditor rule violation settings, the content 
presented to auditors in colleges and universities, in 
continuing education classes, and in various 
publications should explicitly articulate the message 
that rationalization should be avoided and that 
sanctions that are tough and certain. Such measures 
should be effective in reducing the incidence of 
unethical auditor behavior. Nonspecific messages will 
likely have less effect than explicit messages in the 
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training materials. Results reported in Johnston et al., 
2018 establish the increased effectiveness of such 
messages when their rhetoric is designed to match the 
audience and context. Further, ongoing reminders (e.g. 
psychological “nudges”) to staff auditors will result in 
greater compliance with professional standards of 
conduct. 
Generalizing to other contexts beyond auditors, it is 
interesting to consider the role and effectiveness of 
comparable career-ending sanctions. Employees 
caught embezzling funds by hacking into their 
employers’ servers have not uniformly faced extreme 
sanctions; in some cases, these employees were hired 
as consultants to identify security vulnerabilities. In the 
modern era, norm-violating behaviors in the 
workplace, especially in the entertainment media, have 
ended the careers of several very prominent 
broadcasters, journalists, actors, sports stars, and 
movie executives. It remains to be seen whether 
sanctions will deter future potential violators. Within 
the criminal justice system, there continues to be 
debate on the role of extreme sanctions, such as the 
death penalty or imprisonment for life without the 
possibility of parole. Our findings suggest that, even in 
the context of extreme sanctions, individuals will 
justify their deviant behavior and engage in extremely 
egregious behaviors. 
5.4 Research Limitations and Future 
Research 
We adopted numerous measures to ensure the validity 
of our experimental design, measures, and analysis, but 
we identified certain research limitations. Our 
sampling frame consisted of undergraduate and 
graduate accounting students as proxies for auditors. 
Accounting students may or may not be as sensitive to 
deterrence tactics as other subjects but they did provide 
a reasonable proxy for an important sector of powerful 
actors who are authorized and capable of corrupting 
data integrity in a significant way. Though we did not 
use practicing auditors in our sample, our theories can 
be tested using our reasonable surrogates, as these 
high-sanction situations would be recognized by all 
auditors, whether entry level or more experienced. It is 
possible that more experienced auditors would 
evaluate the scenarios differently and it is possible that 
real opportunities to behave unethically would be met 
with different outcomes than reported in response to 
our hypothetical scenarios. We recognize that, even 
with full recognition of extreme sanctions, students 
were evaluating a hypothetical situation that may have 
reduced salience when contrasted with a practicing 
auditor with a mortgage and hungry children at home. 
Related to this limitation is the clustering of our 
respondents’ ages. Although age was not identified as 
a behavioral determinant, it is possible that older 
auditors might respond differently when exposed to 
similar messages on the job.  
A limitation of the factorial survey method is the 
chance that the study participants may have already 
been involved in similar experiences and may feel 
compelled to adopt neutralization techniques to 
preserve their self-image rather than justify the actions 
of the scenario characters (Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
However, this is unlikely given our sampling pool. 
Also, there is no known empirical control for this 
potential confound when using self-reporting. Siponen 
and Vance (2010) suggest that the expected number of 
previous computer abuse violators was likely 
insufficient to skew the results of their study and we 
suggest that the same expectation is reasonable for 
ours. 
Further, we did not test for the impacts of measures to 
increase the perceived accountability of our subjects 
(the degree to which they felt they were held 
accountable for their actions), which has been shown 
to exert an influence on violation decisions (Vance et 
al., 2015). Future research could investigate this factor 
or could investigate this decision-making process 
using emerging neurophysiological research 
techniques (Anderson et al., 2015; Warkentin et al., 
2016) designed to generate objective measures of 
cognitive and affective processes. Future research 
could also differentiate the specific impacts of various 
extreme levels of sanction severity, certainty, and 
celerity. 
Another limitation concerns the cross-sectional design 
of this study. Because the factorial survey design is 
cross-sectional, it did not allow us to account for the 
temporal effects of drift—“a temporary period of 
irresponsibility or an episodic relief from moral 
constraint” (Maruna & Copes, 2005, p. 231). Drift 
could influence intentions to commit computer abuse 
and Maruna and Copes (2005) identify these 
limitations associated with utilizing the factorial 
survey design in their study as well. Both limitations 
could be overcome by employing a longitudinal 
design, which should be considered in future research.  
We tested the impact of five techniques of 
neutralization: the denial of responsibility, the denial 
of injury, the defense of necessity, the appeal to higher 
loyalties, and the metaphor of the ledger in the context 
of auditor rule violations. Our results indicate that 
employees utilize two of these rationalization 
techniques—specifically, the denial of responsibility 
and the appeal to higher loyalties—in their intentions 
to violate policy. While we were able to evaluate the 
specific techniques of neutralization applicable in the 
context of our study, we did not investigate whether an 
employee can invoke a single or several neutralization 
techniques in the context under investigation. Thus, 
future research should attempt to explore whether 
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these neutralization techniques are mutually exclusive 
or whether an individual feels the necessity to 
rationalize their deviant actions through several 
neutralization techniques. Furthermore, we tested the 
five dominant techniques of neutralization, though 
many others have been identified. Future researchers 
could explore the impact of other rationalizations that 
auditors may use to rationalize unethical behavior. 
Future research efforts could also explore the use of 
neutralization techniques ex post, rather than a priori, 
in terms of how they are used to assuage guilt or 
remorse felt in response to deviant workplace behavior 
after the fact. Although Siponen and Vance (2010) and 
other IS scholars have investigated the role of 
neutralization as an antecedent to the formation of 
intention, it certainly could apply to subsequent 
behavior as well, especially regarding behavioral acts 
that are spontaneous rather than deliberative. We urge 
further research into this interesting potential 
phenomenon. 
Sanction certainty is at the heart of much debate in the 
criminal justice system (e.g., mandatory sentencing 
guidelines, stiffer fines, etc.) and has also been the 
focus of much research in information security. 
Although other elements of deterrence (i.e., severity 
and celerity) are interesting, we wanted to test the 
theoretical boundaries of this fundamental core 
element of deterrence theory, especially in terms of 
violators rationalizing norm-violating actions. Future 
research should similarly test the theoretical 
boundaries of other elements of both deterrence and 
neutralization. 
Cover-up behaviors also represent a future avenue of 
research that could provide additional insight into the 
factors that influence auditors’ and IS professionals’ 
behavioral intentions to violate policies. Future 
research could test the findings of our research and 
other boundary conditions in other domains and 
environments. For example, physicians and others 
subject to severe sanctions for policy violations might 
offer an interesting context. Similarly, all students 
know that cheating in class may be subject to severe 
penalties, including expulsion from school. Our target 
behavior may represent an anomalous or unique 
violation scenario, so relaxing the boundary conditions 
from extreme sanctions (for ethical breaches of 
professional auditors) to slightly less severe sanctions 
(for auditors, physicians, politicians, or other 
professionals) could help establish the level at which 
sanction severity is efficacious. The perceived sanction 
severity boundary should be tested in multiple domains 
to strengthen our findings. 
6 Conclusion 
We contextualized and explored the boundary 
conditions of the techniques of neutralization and 
deterrence theory by applying the theoretical lenses of 
the theories’ determinants in a professional context 
with severe deterrence levels. To achieve this 
objective, we used a scenario-based experiment to 
understand key determinants of the formation of 
auditors’ behavioral intentions to violate policy by 
modifying working papers to hide irregularities, 
thereby jeopardizing the integrity and security of the 
accounting information system. Our results indicate 
that auditors may justify their unethical behavior by 
denying responsibility for their personal actions, 
perhaps by believing that they had no choice. We did 
not find sufficient evidence to suggest that these 
behaviors systematically influence the dependent 
variables, and we can presume that most auditors act in 
accordance with professional standards in every 
circumstance. Also, we demonstrated that perceived 
severity of punishment and the certainty of receiving 
punishment are significant deterrents to auditors in this 
context. Although further research into this 
phenomenon is needed, we contribute to the 
understanding of this phenomenon by showing that 
auditors can and will violate policy if they can justify 
their actions and if the punishment is not strong or 
certain, leading to practical implications for the 
profession. We also suggest that our results validate 
the earlier contribution of Siponen and Vance (2010) 
and Willison, et al. (2018) regarding the role of 
neutralization in enabling norm-violating behavior in 
the context of information security standards. Our 
findings also offer insights into the roles that 
deterrence and neutralization processes play in IS-
related workplace deviant behavior in general by more 
closely scrutinizing the applicable range of key 
boundary conditions—i.e., the actual severity of 
formal sanctions. Our work adds to the extant literature 
on deterrence theory and the techniques of 
neutralization, which collectively provide foundational 
support for factors leading to employees’ behavioral 
intentions to violate organizational policies.
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Appendix A: The Auditor Fraud Problem 
Corporate fraud, including unethical auditing behavior, poses a significant cost to business, and incidents have been 
increasing. The average cost of these fraudulent acts has been reported to be $1.2 million (KPMG 2011), whereas the 
estimated total annual costs are in the billions of dollars (ACFE 2012; Humpherys et al., 2011). The American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has also set standards or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
for the preparation, presentation, and reporting of financial statements. Auditors who verify that these financial 
statements are in accordance with the GAAP are mandated by the AICPA to follow the Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards (GAAS). The AICPA also understands the importance of mitigating unethical auditor behavior by issuing a 
lengthy ethical policy, which all CPAs sign and which is extensively discussed in all accounting education programs. 
This should effectively neutralize the effect of the techniques of neutralizations adopted by auditors who violate policy 
(Maruna & Copes 2005,).  
Following several major corporate and accounting scandals—such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco International—the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (Congress 2002) was enacted, setting strict guidelines for auditors in terms of reviewing 
financial information accuracy and internal controls. The importance of internal controls and their impact on financial 
statements are highlighted by SOX, Section 404, which requires that a corporation’s management and the external 
auditors report on the adequacy of the company’s internal controls on financial reporting (SEC, 2007): “Internal 
controls promote efficiency, reduce risk of asset loss, and help ensure the reliability of financial statements and 
compliance with laws and regulations” (COSO, 1994, p. 3).  
Since SOX was enacted, the internal controls of corporations have improved significantly (Protiviti, 2012), although 
concerns remain regarding the adequacy of the improvements. Internal controls, when properly implemented, should 
reduce the likelihood that employees commit fraudulent activities that go unnoticed. However, according to the 2012 
Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse (ACFE 2012), only 1.1% of occupational fraud was detected 
through IT controls and only 3.3% was detected by external auditors. Interestingly, tips or whistleblowers were 
responsible for the detection of 43.3% of occupational fraud incidents in 2012 (ACFE 2012). Recent research also 
suggests that 74% of fraudsters committed their fraudulent acts through the exploitation of weak internal controls 
(KPMG 2011). These findings indicate that the IT controls and external auditors have generally failed to detect 
potential red flags that may indicate fraudulent activities. This also suggests that external auditors have not sufficiently 
reviewed the efficiency of the IT controls or have overlooked potential IT control deficiencies for various reasons 
instead of bringing it to the attention of the management in writing.  
Auditors must make decisions at the nexus of the internal and external environment; they work for an auditing firm 
(with its own unique profile of influences on auditors’ decisions), but they also make decisions that directly affect the 
firms they audit. At the heart of the influences over their decisions is the immediate workplace, however, including 
explicit or implicit pressures by their managers. There is a plethora of research related to occupational fraud and on 
how to detect these cases of fraud at an early stage (Goode & Lacey 2011; Huang et al., 2008; Humpherys et al., 2011; 
Ngai et al., 2011). External auditors have come under scrutiny since the Enron scandal and regulations such as SOX 
have set strict guidelines for them to follow. Though it is important to identify why employees commit fraudulent acts 
in their organizations, it is also important to identify why auditors commit unethical acts. In fact, it is of paramount 
importance to address this critical threat to the validity of corporate financial information, given the unique role that 
auditors play. In one of the most publicized accounting scandals in history, WorldCom executives were found to have 
used fraudulent accounting practices between 1999 and 2002 to alter strategic information for the purpose of disguising 
its mounting losses. Arthur Andersen LLP was the firm’s auditing firm. During the ensuing trial, it was discovered 
that a key working paper was substantially altered to hide Andersen’s knowledge that WorldCom had improperly 
capitalized expenses as early as 1999 (Barrack, 2005). The reasons that led one of the Big Five auditing companies to 
modify working papers to hide irregularities remain unclear. Similar incidents in which intentional noncompliance of 
auditing standards and other fraudulent acts committed by auditors have come into light in the last few years and are 
likely to materialize in the coming years as well. The causes prevail as a critical research question; indeed Sutton (2006) 
and others have called for more practical research into this phenomenon. However, empirical research investigating 
the antecedents that lead auditors to commit fraudulent acts does not exist. 
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Appendix B: Sample Instrument 
Instrument shell: In addition to varying the orthogonal representation of each research construct, we also varied other 
terms to reduce various forms of potential bias. All such items that vary are enclosed in brackets. The underlined items 
are the factors for the factorial survey method (orthogonally distinct) and are underlined for emphasis to help 
participants identify the item statements that vary from scenario version to scenario version. 
[Auditor Name] and the [Client Name] 
[Auditor Name] is a senior auditor and a CPA for a national CPA firm that provides audit, tax, and consulting services 
for multiple clients. [Auditor Name] is the auditor in charge of the fieldwork on the [Client Name] audit. ([Client Name] 
is a publicly traded longstanding client of the firm and receives both audit and tax services). Another longstanding 
publicly-traded client is [Software Company Long Name], which has developed a software package called the 
[Software Company Name Short Name] Accounting Information System (AIS) which is licensed to the general public 
as well as some of the firm’s clients, including [Client Name]. The [Software Company Name Short Name] AIS is a 
popular system and [Client Name] recently issued a press release that they were adopting this system. During the 
course of this audit assignment, [Auditor Name] is asked to evaluate the information systems general controls of the 
accounting information system which happens to be the [Software Company Name Short Name] AIS. 
After testing the controls for the inventory impairment computer application, [Auditor Name] uncovers an information 
technology weakness in the [Software Company Name Short Name] AIS system which may introduce IT security 
vulnerabilities. [Auditor Name] believes that these security-oriented control deficiencies are significant and therefore, 
material. After reviewing the working papers for the information technology general controls portion of the audit, 
[Auditor Name]'s supervisor told him to [Degree of Violation Statement]. [Auditor Name] [Technique of 
Neutralization Statement]. [Auditor Name] [Deterrence Theory Statement]. 
 
Table B1. Factors and their Respective Items (Variables) 
Factor Manipulation 
Techniques of neutralization  
Denial of responsibility Believes that since his supervisor told him to modify the report, he has no control over 
the decision 
Denial of injury Believes that no one would be harmed by modifying the report 
Defense of necessity Believes that if she does not modify the report, his firm will lose [client name] as a 
client 
Appeal to higher loyalties Believes that modifying the report would not be as bad as modifying the financial 
statement numbers 
Metaphor of the ledger Believes that all her past reports were appropriate, so it would be OK to modify the 
report just this one time 
(No technique of neutralization) This item would not have been in the scenario. 
Deterrence theory  
Low sanction certainty, with low 
sanction severity 
Believes that his chances of being caught are low, but if caught, the punishment would 
be minimal 
Low sanction certainty, with high 
sanction severity 
Believes that her chances of being caught are low, but if caught, the punishment would 
be severe 
High sanction certainty, with low 
sanction severity 
Believes that his chances of being caught are high, and if caught, the punishment would 
be minimal 
High sanction certainty, with high 
sanction severity 
Believes that her chances of being caught are high, and if caught, the punishment would 
be severe 
Degree of violation  
Degree of violation: high Remove all of the references to control deficiencies regarding the [software co. Name] 
AIS package from the report 
Degree of violation: low Minimize the references to control deficiencies regarding the [software co. Name] AIS 
package from the report 
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Appendix C: Sample Instrument  
Varied items randomly populated (conditions for this sample instrument = technique of neutralization: defense of 
necessity; deterrence level: high sanction certainty, with high sanction severity; degree of violation: high): 
Joe and Creative Corp 
Joe is a senior auditor and a CPA for a national CPA firm that provides audit, tax, and consulting services for multiple 
clients. Joe is the auditor in charge of the fieldwork on the Creative Corp audit. (Creative Corp is a publicly traded 
longstanding client of the firm and receives both audit and tax services). Another longstanding publicly traded client 
is Triple Point Enterprises, which has developed a software package called the Triple Point Accounting Information 
System (AIS) which is licensed to the general public as well as some of the firm’s clients, including Creative Corp. 
The Triple Point AIS is a popular system and Creative Corp recently issued a press release that they were adopting this 
system. During this audit assignment, Joe is asked to evaluate the information systems general controls of the 
accounting information system which happens to be the Triple Point AIS. 
After testing the controls for the inventory impairment computer application, Joe uncovers an information technology 
weakness in the Triple Point AIS system which may introduce IT security vulnerabilities. Joe believes that these 
security-oriented control deficiencies are significant and therefore, material. After reviewing the working papers for 
the information technology general controls portion of the audit, Joe’s supervisor told him to remove all of the 
references to control deficiencies regarding the Triple Point AIS package from the working papers. Joe believes that if 
he does not modify the report, his firm will lose Triple Point Enterprises as their client. Joe believes that his chances 
of being caught are high, and if caught, the punishment would be severe. 
It is stated in the scenario that Joe is told by his supervisor to: 
_____ remove all of the references to control deficiencies regarding the Triple Point AIS package from the working 
papers 
_____ minimize the references to control deficiencies regarding the Triple Point AIS package from the working papers. 
If you were Joe, what is the likelihood that you might follow the supervisor's instructions and modify the 
working papers? 
Unlikely to modify       Likely to modify 
the working papers             Unsure    the working papers  
 1  2  3  4  5 
What is the likelihood that other auditors in Joe’s situation might follow the supervisor's instructions and 
modify the working papers? 
Unlikely to modify       Likely to modify 
the working papers             Unsure    the working papers  
 1  2  3  4  5 
Please tell us a little about yourself. Remember that you are completely anonymous.  
Your Gender:  
Male   Female  
Your Age:  
18-21  22-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60+ 
Did you have an internship? Yes  No  
 
*** Please note that the student’s university status as a graduate or undergraduate student was not queried in the 
instrument. We obtained this information by directing the participants to separate instruments for graduate students 
and undergraduate students. 
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Appendix D: Sensitivity Analysis of the Individual Items Composing the 
Dependent Variable 
 
Table D1. Panel A: USING logDV1: Mixed Model Analysis Results for the 
 Individual Impact of Magnitude of Alteration, Techniques of Neutralization, and Deterrence Theory  
on an Auditor’s Behavioral Intention to Violate Policy 
 Predicted sign Beta Z 
(Constant) n/a  0.81  8.13* 
TN1 +  0.10  1.06 
TN2 + -0.05 -0.71 
TN3 +  0.03  0.42 
TN4 +  0.05  0.64 
TN5 + -0.06 -0.86 
DT2 - -0.23 -3.43* 
DT3 - -0.22 -3.20* 
DT4 - -0.49 -7.72* 
RM1 - -0.10 -1.83 
Grad - -0.03 -0.28 
Gender n/a 0.02  0.18 
Internship - 0.06 0.59 
Note: 
N = 304, R2 = 0.16, *Significant at the 0.001 level 
TN1 = Denial of responsibility, TN2 = Denial of injury, TN3 = Defense of necessity, TN4 = Appeal to higher loyalties,  
TN5 = Metaphor of the ledger 
DT2 = Sanction certainty is low and sanction severity is high, DT3 = Sanction certainty is high and sanction severity is low 
DT4 = Sanction certainty is high and sanction severity is high,  
RM1 = Degree of Violation where 1 = remove all of the references and 0 = minimized all references 
Grad = Dummy variable where 1 = graduate student and 0 = undergraduate student, Gender = Dummy variable where 1 = male and 0 = female 
Internship = Dummy variable where 1 = participated in an internship and 0 = did not participate in an internship 
 
Table D2. Panel B: USING DV2: Mixed Model Analysis Results for the Individual Impact of Magnitude  
of Alteration, Techniques of Neutralization, and Deterrence Theory  
on an Auditor’s Behavioral Intention to Violate policy 
 Predicted sign Beta Z 
(Constant) n/a  3.83 19.31** 
TN1 +  0.33   1.84 
TN2 +  0.02   0.14 
TN3 +  0.21   1.30 
TN4 +  0.14   1.02 
TN5 +  0.03   0.22 
DT2 - -0.58 -3.79** 
DT3 - -0.40 -3.11* 
DT4 - -1.11 -7.93** 
RM1 - -0.07 -0.56 
Grad - -0.11 -0.52 
Gender n/a -0.19 -1.06 
Internship -  0.26  1.34 
Note:N = 304, R2 = 0.16, * Significant at the 0.01 level ** Significant at the 0.001 level 
TN1 = Denial of responsibility, TN2 = Denial of injury, TN3 = Defense of necessity, TN4 = Appeal to higher loyalties 
TN5 = Metaphor of the ledger 
DT2 = Sanction certainty is low and sanction severity is high, DT3 = Sanction certainty is high and sanction severity is low 
DT4 = Sanction certainty is high and sanction severity is high,  
RM1 = Degree of Violation where 1 = remove all of the references and 0 = minimized all references 
Grad = Dummy variable where 1 = graduate student and 0 = undergraduate student, Gender = Dummy variable where 1 = male and 0 = female 
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